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Artificial-Noise-Aided Message Authentication
Codes with Information-Theoretic Security
Xiaofu Wu, Zhen Yang, Cong Ling, and Xiang-Gen Xia
Abstract—In the past, two main approaches for the purpose
of authentication, including information-theoretic authentication
codes and complexity-theoretic message authentication codes
(MACs), were almost independently developed. In this paper, we
propose a new cryptographic primitive, namely, artificial-noise-
aided MACs (ANA-MACs), which can be considered as both
computationally secure and information-theoretically secure. For
ANA-MACs, we introduce artificial noise to interfere with the
complexity-theoretic MACs and quantization is further employed
to facilitate packet-based transmission. With a channel coding
formulation of key recovery in the MACs, the generation of
standard authentication tags can be seen as an encoding process
for the ensemble of codes, where the shared key between Alice
and Bob is considered as the input and the message is used
to specify a code from the ensemble of codes. Then, we show
that the introduction of artificial noise in ANA-MACs can be
well employed to resist the key recovery attack even if the
opponent has an unlimited computing power. Finally, a pragmatic
approach for the analysis of ANA-MACs is provided, and we
show how to balance the three performance metrics, including
the completeness error, the false acceptance probability, and the
conditional equivocation about the key. The analysis can be well
applied to a class of ANA-MACs, where MACs with Rijndael
cipher are employed.
Index Terms—Information-theoretic authentication codes, mes-
sage authentication codes, channel coding and decoding,
information-theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
MESSAGE authentication codes (MACs) are crypto-graphic primitives used extensively in the construction
of security services, including authentication, nonrepudiation,
and integrity. Basically, message authentication is to ensure
that an accepted message truly comes from its acclaimed
transmitter. When the transmitter intends to send a message,
it also generates a MAC, which is a function of the message
and a shared key, known only to both the transmitter and the
receiver. The generated MAC is often appended to the message
[1]. At the receiver, a MAC is computed from the received
message and compared to the MAC that is transmitted. If the
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two MACs are identical, then the transmitter is identified as
a legal user and it is highly likely the received message is
exactly equal to the one transmitted.
In the past, two main approaches, including information-
theoretic authentication codes [2], [3] and complexity-theoretic
MACs, were almost independently developed for the purpose
of authentication. In general, they differ in the assumptions
about the capabilities of an opponent. Information-theoretic
authentication codes, which are based on information theory,
offer unconditional security, i.e., security independent of the
computing power of an adversary. The complexity-theoretic
approach starts from an abstract model for computation, and
assumes that the opponent has limited computing power. Due
to their high flexibility, the complexity-theoretic MACs find
widespread applications in practice.
Complexity-theoretic MAC algorithms can be constructed
from other cryptographic primitives, such as cryptographic
hash functions, or block cipher algorithms. Currently, the
security of MAC algorithms rely on the hardness of hash
functions, i.e, given the message and its MAC, it is “hard”
to forge a MAC on a new message. This means that they
can be broken if the adversary has an unlimited power of
computation.
In recent years, there has been various efforts [4]–[7] in
authenticating the transmitter and receiver at the physical layer,
based on prior coordination or secret sharing, where the sender
is authenticated if the receiver can successfully demodulate
and decode the transmission. In [4], a physical-layer authen-
tication scheme was proposed, in which MACs, along with
messages, are transmitted concurrently over the physical layer.
Compared to the traditional transmission approach above the
physical layer, the authors claim the possibility of information-
theoretic security due to the presence of channel noise. How-
ever, its security often depends on the physical channel.
In this paper, we develop a new cryptographic primi-
tive, artificial-noise-aided MACs (ANA-MACs) for ensuring
information-theoretic security. The use of artificial noise in
ANA-MACs makes it difficult for an opponent to derive
the key. With the use of quantization, ANA-MACs can be
encapsulated and transmitted in packets above the physical
layer, just like the traditional MACs, which is in sharp contrast
to existing physical layer authentication schemes.
It should be pointed out that the proposed ANA-MACs are
also different with the binary approximate message authenti-
cation codes (AMACs) [8], [9] and the noise-tolerant message
authentication codes (NT-MACs) [10]. Both AMACs and NT-
MACs are designed to tolerate some channel errors during the
transmission of messages. For ANA-MACs, a slight change
2in messages may result in a rapid change for authentication
tags, as often encountered in the traditional MACs. Yet, ANA-
MACs can tolerate some channel errors occurred during the
transmission of tags. Furthermore, both AMACs and NT-
MACs are computationally secure, while ANA-MACs may
ensure some degree of information-theoretic security.
Throughout this paper, we do not discriminate the notations
between scalars and vectors, which will be made clear from
the contexts. For a binary vector t, its bipolar form is simply
denoted as t¯, in which each component takes value from
{+1,−1}. To be consistent with the standard convention in
algorithms and complexity theory, where the running time of
an algorithm is measured as a function of the length of its input
n, we will thus provide the adversary and the honest parties
with the security parameter in unary as 1n (i.e., a string of n
1’s) when necessary [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some prelim-
inaries on both information-theoretic authentication codes and
MACs are made in Section-II. In Section-III, a new crypto-
graphic primitive, ANA-MACs, is proposed and its verification
mechanism is given. Then, its security analysis is formulated
in Section-IV. In Section-V, we provide a pragmatic approach
for analysis of ANA-MACs. Section-VI presents numerical
results and the conclusion is made in Section-VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Information-Theoretic (Systematic) Authentication Codes
A systematic authentication code is a triple of (S, T ,K) of
finite sets and a mapping E : K × S → T , where S is the
source state space, T is the tag space, K is the key space, and
E(k, ·) , Ek : S → T is often called an encoding rule for a
given k ∈ K.
Two trusting parties, Alice (or a transmitter) and Bob (or
a receiver), share a secret key k ∈ K. To send a piece of
information (called source state) s ∈ S to Bob, Alice computes
t = Ek(s) ∈ T and puts the message m = (s, t) into a public
channel. After receiving m′ = (s′, t′), Bob will compute
E′k(s) and check whether t′ = E′k(s). If yes, Bob will accept
it as authentic. Otherwise, Bob will reject it.
We assume that an opponent (or Eve) has a complete
understanding of the system, including the mapping E. The
only thing she does not know is the key k agreed upon by
Alice and Bob, which is used to specify a particular encoding
rule Ek. We also assume that Eve has the ability to introduce
a message into the channel. After observation of the first r
messages m1, · · · ,mr, Eve places her own message m into
the channel, attempting to make Bob accept it as authentic.
This is called a spoofing attack of order r. In literature,
there are often two different types of spoofing attack, i.e.,
impersonation attack and substitution attack. An impersonation
attack at time r + 1 [12] is just the spoofing attack of order
r. In a so-called substitution attack at time r, Eve observed
r messages m1, · · · ,mr and replaces the message mr by a
different message which she hopes to be accepted by Bob.
For systematic authentication codes, a source state s is
assumed to be public (without security) whenever m = (s, t)
is transmitted, which can be freely accessed by both Bob and
Eve. For this reason, we simply use the authentication tag t
instead of a full message m in what follows.
Let K,Tr+1 and T r denote the random variables describing
the key, the r + 1-th tag and a sequence of r tags from
time 1 to r, and taking values k, tr+1 and tr = (t1, · · · , tr),
respectively. Let pr denote the expected probability of suc-
cessful deception for a spoofing attack of order r and Pr the
probability of successful deception if Eve can observe at most
r messages. Walker [13] proved
pr ≥ 2H(K|T r+1)−H(K|T r) = 2−I(K;Tr+1|T r) (1)
and Rosenbaum [14] proved
Pr ≥ 2− 1r+1H(K), (2)
which hold even if Eve has an unlimited power of computation.
If the equality in (2) holds, the corresponding authentication
code is called r-perfect.
To prevent Eve from using t = Ek(s) to learn the key k,
it should have sufficient number of solutions of k for a given
t = Ek(s) [2]. Given s and t, let K(s, t) , {k : Ek(s) =
t, ∀k ∈ K} denotes the set of solutions for t = Ek(s). It
follows that the successful deception probability for a given
pair (s, t) has a lower bound of
p1(s, t) ≥ 1|K(s, t)| . (3)
In [2], projective plane codes were proposed to achieve the
best possible spoofing attack of order 1, namely, P1 = 1√
|K|
.
For the best authentication codes achieving the lower bound
of P1, it was proved that
1) |K(s1, t1)
⋂K(s2, t2)| = 1 if s1 6= s2;
2) |K(s, t)| =√|K| for ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T ;
3) |{t : |K(s, t)| > 0}| =√|K| for ∀s ∈ S.
However, this class of authentication codes cannot resist the
spoofing attack of order r ≥ 2.
Theorem 1: For 1-perfect systematic authentication codes,
they cannot resist the spoofing attack of order r ≥ 2, namely,
pr = 1, ∀r ≥ 2.
Proof: It is enough to consider r = 2. Suppose that
Eve has accessed two different messages m1 = (s1, t1) and
m2 = (s2, t2), where s1 6= s2. To insert a new message
m = (s, t), where s 6= s1, s2, Eve wants to derive the key
k, which can be surely learned from two available messages
since |K(s1, t1)
⋂K(s2, t2)| = 1. Indeed, there is a single
common solution of k for t1 = Ek(s1) and t2 = Ek(s2) if
s1 6= s2.
Given sr = (s1, · · · , sr) and tr = (t1, · · · , tr), let
K(sr, tr) , {k : Ek(si) = ti, i = 1, · · · , r, ∀k ∈ K} denote
the set of solutions for ti = Ek(si), i = 1, · · · , r. Clearly,
K(sr, tr) = ⋂i=1,··· ,r K(si, ti).
For r-perfect authentication codes, it was shown in [14] that
|K(si, ti)| = |K| r+1−ir+1 , i ∈ {1, · · · , r + 1}.
and H(K|T r+1) = 0. Hence, we also have the same result as
that of Theorem 1 for r-perfect authentication codes.
Theorem 2: For r-perfect authentication codes, they cannot
resist the spoofing attack of order l ≥ r + 1, namely, pl =
1, ∀l ≥ r + 1.
3B. Complexity-Theoretic MACs
Definition 1: A message authentication code Π =
(Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is a triple of algorithms with associated key
space K, source message (state) space S1, and tag space T .
- Key Generation. Upon input 1n, the algorithm Gen
outputs a uniformly distributed key k of length n:
k ← Gen(1n).
- Tagging. The probabilistic authentication algorithm
Mack(s) takes as input a secret key k ∈ K and a source
message s ∈ S and outputs an authentication tag t ∈ T
.
- Verification. The deterministic verification algorithm
Vrfyk(s, t) takes as input a secret key k, a source
message s ∈ S and a tag t ∈ T and outputs an element
of the set {0, 1}.
A complexity-theoretic MAC Π = (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) can be
formulated with a keyed hash function. Formally, the tag is a
function of the source message s and the secret key k
t = ~(k, s), (4)
where ~ : K × S → T is a keyed hash function.
The verification algorithm takes k, s, t as inputs and outputs
a binary decision
ν = ϑ(k, s, t), (5)
where ν ∈ {0, 1}, and ϑ(k, s, t) = 1 if t = ~(s, k), zero
otherwise.
Note that a MAC implies a two-round authentication proto-
col: the verifier chooses a random message as challenge, and
the prover returns the MAC on the message.
Definition 2 (Completeness [15]): We say that a MAC has
completeness error α if for all s ∈ S 2
P [ϑ(k, s, t) = 0 : k ← Gen(1n), t← ~k(s)] ≤ α. (6)
It is clear that the completeness error α means that the
successful authentication probability is larger than 1 − α for
two trusted parties.
C. Remark
Information-theoretic (systematic) authentication codes pro-
vide message authenticity guarantees in an information theo-
retic sense within a symmetric key setting. However, infor-
mation theoretic bounds on the spoofing attack of order r
show that they are still vulnerable (Theorems 1 and 2) if
the opponent can access much more authenticated messages.
Complexity-theoretic MACs can be seen as a counterpart
of information-theoretic authentication codes in the field of
computational security, without considering the information-
theoretic deception probability.
In the past, information-theoretic authentication codes and
complexity-theoretic MACs are almost independently devel-
oped. It is interesting to ask if we can construct MACs, which
are both computationally secure and information-theoretically
secure.
1In literature, the message space M is often used.
2It requires to hold for all n ∈ N in [15] while the completeness error is
defined for a given and fixed n in this paper.
III. ARTIFICIAL-NOISE-AIDED MACS
A. Basic Idea
We have shown that information-theoretic (systematic) au-
thentication codes take the same function as message authen-
tication codes. If E(k, s) = ~(k, s), ∀k ∈ K, s ∈ S, they are
actually the same.
In general, the authentication tag is a deterministic function
of a source message s and the key k shared between Alice
and Bob. The only exception is the authentication codes with
splitting, where the mapping ~ : K × S → T is allowed to
be stochastic in the sense that, for given k and s, ~(k, s) is a
stochastic variable.
Noting that the use of a stochastic encoding mapping in
authentication may be helpful for preventing possible spoofing
attacks, since the conditional equivocation about the key may
increase compared to a deterministic mapping. In order to
make this ideal more practical, we propose to introduce
artificial noise to corrupt the standard authentication tags.
On one hand, the introduction of artificial noise may in-
crease the conditional equivocation about the key, namely,
H(K|T˜ ) ≥ H(K|T ). Here T and T˜ denote the random
variables for the standard authentication tag and artificial-
noise-corrupted authentication tag, respectively. On the other
hand, the successful authentication probability may decrease
as the introduction of noise. Nevertheless, this can be made
acceptable in practice if the completeness error is negligible.
B. Formulation
Suppose that |T | = 2l, |K| = 2n. To prevent possible
eavesdropping, we propose to introduce artificial noise to
interfere with the clean tag, and then quantization is used to
facilitate packet-based transmission.
An artificial-noise-aided message authentication code
(ANA-MAC) is thus with a probabilistic algorithm ~qwk to
produce the tag
t˜← ~qwk (s) (7)
when the inputs are k, s.
In this paper, we consider an explicit construction of ~qwk (s)
as follows
t = ~(k, s),
t˜ = Q (t¯+ w) , (8)
where t¯ is the l-length bipolar vector form of t, w is an
artificially-introduced Gaussian-distributed noise vector with
zero mean and variance of σ2wIl (Il denotes the identity matrix
of size l× l), Q(x) is a q-bit quantization function, and t˜ ∈ T˜
is a l-length vector, where each component takes value from a
finite quantization level set V = {v1, v2, · · · , v2q} of size 2q.
Clearly, T˜ = V l, where V l denotes the cartesian power of a
set V .
With the introduction of artificial noise and quantization, the
size of an original tag t is expanded by q times. In practice,
q = 8 is often enough.
Given s and k, it is possible to partition T˜ into two
disjoint sets, namely, T˜ = T˜A(k, s) ∪ T˜F (k, s), where
4P
(
t˜ ∈ T˜A(k, s)
)
≥ 1 − α. In essence, the verification al-
gorithm for ANA-MAC is to find a deterministic partition of
T˜ for given s and k, which minimizes the false acceptance
probability and at the same time keeps the successful authen-
tication probability not smaller than a target value of 1− α.
Whenever such a partition is determined, the verification
algorithm can be well formulated. It takes k, s, t˜ as inputs and
outputs a binary decision
ν = ϑ(k, s, t˜), (9)
where ν ∈ {0, 1}, ϑ(k, s, t˜) = 1 if t˜ ∈ T˜A(k, s) and zero
otherwise.
An ANA-MAC has completeness error α if for all s ∈ S,
P
[
ϑ(k, s, t˜) = 0 : k ← Gen(1n), t˜← ~qwk (s)
] ≤ α. (10)
C. Verification with Hypothesis Testing
1) Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis testing is the task of
deciding which of two hypotheses, H0 or H1, is true, when
one is given the value of a random variable U (e.g., the
outcome of a measurement). The behavior of U is described
by two probability distributions: If H0 or H1 is true, then U
is distributed according to the distribution pH0(u) or pH1(u),
respectively.
Let PD = 1 − α be the detection probability, namely,
the probability of successful declaration of H0 when H0 is
actually true, and Pf = β be the false alarm probability,
namely, the probability of false declaration of H0 when H1 is
actually true.
The optimal decision rule is given by the famous Neyman-
Pearson theorem which states that, for a given maximal
tolerable false alarm probability β, α can be minimized by
assuming hypothesis if and only if
log
pH0(U = u)
pH1(U = u)
≥ ̺ (11)
for some threshold ̺ depending on α.
Let the function D(α, β) be defined by
D(α, β) = α log α
1− β + (1− α) log
1− α
β
. (12)
With optimal hypothesis testing (11), its detection probabil-
ity and false alarm probability are closely connected [12].
Lemma 1: The detection probability 1 − α and the false
alarm probability β satisfy
D(α, β) ≤ DKL (pH0(u)||pH1(u)) (13)
where the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence can be written as
DKL (f(x)||g(x)) =
∑
x
f(x) log
f(x)
g(x)
(14)
for two probability distributions f(x), g(x).
2) Verification: Now, we focus on the design of verification
algorithm for ANA-MACs, which often deals with the imper-
sonation attack. The problem of deciding whether a received
tag is authentic or not can be viewed as a hypothesis testing
problem [12].
Let H0 correspond to the hypothesis that the tag is au-
thentic, and H1 correspond to the hypothesis that the tag has
been generated by an adversary. With a standard packet-level
transmission above the physical layer, it is assumed that both
a legitimate user and an adversary can get a error-free copy
of the tag, namely, t˜.
To facilitate the derivation, we simply assume that t˜ = t¯+w,
where the quantization is simply omitted. This is a reasonable
approximation if a fine quantization method with sufficient
number of quantization levels is employed.
To be more concrete, we consider the “Alice-Bob-Eve”
model, where Eve, as an impersonation attacker, wants to
inject messages into the legitimate transmission from Alice
to Bob. Suppose Alice and Bob shared a key k, which is
employed to authenticate each other. With inputs k, s, t˜, Bob
wants to decide if t˜ is from Alice. Eve does not know the
shared key k, and it is assumed that Eve generates a random
key kE for authentication as there is no any information about
k available. Essentially, this is cast as a binary hypothesis
testing problem:
H0 : K = k
H1 : K = kE .
In this case, U = (T˜ ,K), u = (t˜, k). Under hypothesis
H0, the pair u = (t˜, k) (seen by the receiver) is generated
according to the distribution p(t˜, K = k), whereas under
hypothesis H1, u = (t˜, k) is generated according to the
distribution p(t˜) · P (K = k). This is because that in the
case of H1, the generations of authentication tag and key are
independent of each other as there is no means to efficiently
guess the key.
The formulation of the optimum binary hypothesis testing
can be written as
η = log
pH0(U = u)
pH1(U = u)
= log
p(t˜, K = k)
p(t˜)P (K = k)
= log
p(t˜|K = k)∑
k′∈K p(t˜|K = k′)P (K = k′)
. (15)
The optimal decision rule is given by η > ̺ for some threshold
̺ depending on α.
Now, it is clear that a partition of T˜ for the purpose of
verification can be done as
T˜A(k, s) =
{
t˜ ∈ T˜ : η > ̺
}
. (16)
As the source message s is assumed to be available, it
follows that
p(t˜|k) ∝ exp
[
− (t˜− t¯)
T (t˜− t¯)
2σ2w
]
(17)
with t = ~(k, s) and t¯ is its bipolar (column) vector form.
In general, this binary hypothesis testing problem in its
optimum form can not be easily tackled as it requires to
enumerate 2n keys with a priori uniform distribution.
5As the optimum hypothesis testing is difficult to implement,
we propose to use a simple test statistic
η = µ¯T t˜, (18)
and η is further compared to a threshold value ̺ for making a
final decision, where µ = ~(k, s) is the tag generated by Bob
and µ¯ is its bipolar vector form.
This approach can be viewed as a code acquisition ap-
proach encountered in code-division multiple-access (CDMA)
communication systems, where the tag signature µ can be
considered as a unique pseudo-noise (PN) code, which is
available at the sides of both Alice and Bob, but keeps
unknown to any potential attacker.
In both hypotheses, η is the sum of l normally distributed
random variables, which is still normally distributed. There-
fore, it suffices to compute its mean and variance.
In the case of hypothesis H0, one can show that
η|H0 = l + z0, (19)
where z0 =
∑l
i=1 µ¯iwi. We denote its mean and variance as
η¯0 , E{η|H0} = l,
σ2H0 , Var{η|H0} = lσ2w. (20)
By decomposing the hypothesis H1 into a series of sub-
hypothesises
{
Hk
′
1 : H1,K = k
′
}
, i.e., by further assuming
that Eve impersonates Alice using the key k′, we have
η|Hk′1 = l − 2dH (~(k, s), ~(k′, s)) + z1, (21)
where z1 =
∑l
i=1 µ¯iwi and dH(x, y) denotes the Hamming
distance between two binary strings of x and y. Then,
η¯k
′
1 ,E{η|H1, k′} = l − 2dH (~(k, s), ~(k′, s)) ,
σ2
Hk
′
1
,Var{η|H1, k′} = lσ2w. (22)
It is clear that η|H0 ∼ N
(
η¯0, σ
2
H0
)
and η|Hk′1 ∼
N
(
η¯k
′
1 , σ
2
Hk
′
1
)
.
The authentication is typically claimed if η ≥ ̺. Hence,
the successful authentication probability (or the detection
probability) can be simply computed as
PD = Q
(
̺− η¯0
σH0
)
, (23)
where
Q(x) =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt. (24)
With this setting of threshold ̺, according to the distribution
of η|H1, a false alarm probability β can be calculated as
β = Ek′
[
Q
(
̺− η¯k′1
σHk′
1
)]
. (25)
We comment here that the successful authentication prob-
ability (23) can be directly computed while the false alarm
probability is difficult to compute in general, since it should
enumerate all possible keys, which is of size 2n. Furthermore,
the above formulation in general depends on the source
message s as show by (22). Indeed, one should enumerate
all keys to compute the false alarm probability for any given
s ∈ S. This seems to be an impossible task. Later in Section-
V, we, however, show that it is possible to compute it in a
closed-form expression thanks to the pseudorandomness of the
complexity-theoretic MACs.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Information-Theoretic Bounds
Consider an impersonation attack on the (r + 1)th source
message sr+1. We adopt the powerful hypothesis-testing for-
mulation originally proposed by Maurer [12]. The receiver
knows K and r messages m1 = (s1, t˜1), · · · ,mr = (sr, t˜r),
and sees a message mr+1 = (sr+1, t˜r+1) which could either
be a correct message sent by Alice (hypothesis H0) or a
fraudulent message inserted by Eve (hypothesis H1).
For this spoofing attacker of order r, the opponent’s
strategy for impersonation at time r + 1 can be
described by an arbitrary probability distribution
[12] QMr+1=mr+1|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr . If the opponent
chooses to use QMr+1=mr+1|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr =
PMr+1=mr+1|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr , the cheating probability
has the following lower bound.
Theorem 3: Consider the spoofing attack of order r for an
ANA-MAC, where the opponent generates an ANA-MAC tag
T˜r+1 when she/he observed r ANA-MAC tags (T˜ r). We have
D (α, pr) ≤ I
(
K; T˜r+1|T˜1, · · · , T˜r
)
, (26)
and for α = 0,
pr ≥ 2−I(K;T˜r+1|T˜1,··· ,T˜r). (27)
Proof: Consider probability distributions conditioned on
the event that M1 = m1, · · · ,Mr = mr. Under hypothesis
H0, the pair U = [Mr+1,K] (seen by the receiver) is
generated according to the probability distribution
PMr+1,K|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr ,
whereas under hypothesis H1, U = [Mr+1,K] is generated
according to the distribution
PMr+1=mr+1|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr · PK|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr .
For ANA-MACs, each message m can be written as m =
(s, t˜), where the source message s is carried without secrecy
and hence is accessible even for any opponent. Hence, we
can employ a more compact form for probability distributions,
namely,
PMr+1,K|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr = PT˜r+1,K|T˜1=t˜1,··· ,T˜r=t˜r ,
PMr+1=mr+1|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr = PT˜r+1|T˜1=t˜1,··· ,T˜r=t˜r ,
PK|M1=m1,··· ,Mr=mr = PK|T˜1=t˜1,··· ,T˜r=t˜r .
Let pr(t˜1, · · · , t˜r) denote the successful deception probabil-
ity for a particular observed sequence T˜1 = t˜1, · · · , T˜r = t˜r,
which is the probability of accepting hypothesis H1 when H0
is actually true. According to Lemma 1, we have
D (α, pr(t˜1, · · · , t˜r)) ≤ I (K; T˜r+1|T˜1 = t˜1, · · · , T˜r = t˜r) .
6Then, it is straightforward to show both (26) and (27) just did
in [12].
To gain further insights into the spoofing attack, we can also
follow the derivation process employed in [14] [16].
Within the framework of ANA-MACs, we argue that the
opponent should do her/his best to generate a clear authenti-
cation tag t, instead of a noise-corrupted version t˜, given that
t˜r has been observed for a spoofing attack of order r. Indeed,
if an illegal tag is generated by the opponent, the introduction
of the artificial noise may slightly increase the false acceptance
probability. However, this increase is often minor as the false
acceptance probability should be less than a small target value
in the design of ANA-MACs.
Theorem 4: Consider the spoofing attack of order r for an
ANA-MAC, where the opponent generates a clear tag Tr+1
when she/he observed r ANA-MAC tags (T˜ r). We have
pr ≥ 2−I(K;Tr+1|T˜1,··· ,T˜r). (28)
Proof: Let Pr(t|t˜r) denote the probability that t would be
a valid choice for T˜r+1 given that T˜ r = t˜r has been observed.
Then,
Pr(t|t˜r) =
∑
k∈K
P (t, k|t˜r) =
∑
k∈K
P (t|k, t˜r)P (k|t˜r)
=
∑
k∈K(t)
P (k|t˜r), (29)
where K(t) is the set of keys under which t is a valid tag.
Given that t˜r has been observed, the opponent’s optimum
strategy is to substitute the tag t that maximizes Pr(t|t˜r). Thus,
the success probability given that t˜r has been observed in an
optimum spoofing attack of order r is
Pr(t˜
r) , max
t∈T
Pr(t|t˜r)
≥
∑
t∈T
P (Tr+1 = t|t˜r)Pr(t|t˜r)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K(t)
P (Tr+1 = t|t˜r)P (k|t˜r)
= E
{
P (Tr+1 = t|t˜r)P (k|t˜r)
P (Tr+1 = t, k|t˜r)
}
(30)
where E is the conditional expectation given that T˜ r = t˜r.
By use of Jensen’s inequality, we have
Pr(t˜
r) ≥ 2H(K,Tr+1|T˜ r=t˜r)−H(Tr+1|T˜ r=t˜r)−H(K|T˜ r=t˜r)
= 2−I(K,Tr+1|T˜
r=t˜r). (31)
As shown in (29), the conditional cheating probability is
determined by the opponent’s capability to compute the a
posterior probabilities about the key when she/he observed r
tags, namely, P (k|t˜r), ∀k ∈ K. Therefore, it is interesting to
develop a coding formulation for the problem of key recovery
in ANA-MACs.
B. A Coding Formulation for Key Recovery in MACs
Consider the key recovery problem for the spoofing attack of
order r, namely, the opponent has accessed r messages m1 =
(s1, t1), · · · ,mr = (sr, tr) and he/she wants to recover the
key. Now, we present a coding formulation for this problem.
In the opponent’s view (for key recovery), the generation
of possible tags for a given message s can be considered as a
deterministic encoding process of
~(·, s) : K → T . (32)
Given r source messages sr, the generation of possible r-
tags is with a determinist encoding process of
~(·, sr) , [~(·, s1), · · · , ~(·, sr)] : K → T r. (33)
That means, given r source messages sr = (s1, · · · , sr) ∈
Sr, it is possible to generate a code C(sr), which is comprised
of |K| = 2n codewords, namely,
C(sr) = {c1(sr), · · · , c2n(sr)}, (34)
where each codeword ck(sr) = (~ (k, s1) , · · · , ~ (k, sr)) is
indexed by a possible key k ∈ K.
In what follows, we say C(sr) as an r-order MAC, corre-
sponding to the spoofing attack of order r.
Clearly, there are |K| = 2n codewords. Suppose that the
cardinality of tag space is |T | = 2l and each tag is of the
equal binary bit length l, the coding rate of C(sr) can be
defined as
Rc(r) =
n
rl
. (35)
Since the source message s is generated according to a finite
message set S, the opponent has to consider an ensemble of
codes Ωr(C) = {C(sr) : sr ∈ Sr}, which is all of fixed coding
rate Rc(r).
This ensemble of codes Ωr(C) is revealed to both Alice and
Bob. From a standard cryptographic view, this code ensemble
is also revealed to Eve.
In the literature, the size of tag space is often not larger than
the size of key, which yields Rc(1) ≥ 1. For information-
theoretic authentication codes, it is always assumed that
Rc(r) > 1 for some r’s. Otherwise, it is not secure. For
the MACs encountered in practice, Rc(1) ≥ 1. However,
Rc(r) ≤ 1 typically for r ≥ 2. For example, the 3GPP
employs a challenge-response authentication scheme, where
the binary length of a tag is l = 64, while the binary length
of a key is n = 128.
According to the value of coding rate Rc(r), it can be
formulated as either a source coding problem (Rc(r) > 1)
or a channel coding problem (Rc(r) ≤ 1) for key recovery in
MACs.
In [17], the link between authentication theory and rate-
distortion theory was exploited and the rate-distortion function
appears in a powerful lower bound to the probability of an
authentication fraud. In essence, Sgarro introduced a binary
fraud matrix, which tells which authenticated tags cheat which
keys under the given attack: χ(k, t) = 1 iff the authenticated
message m = (s, t) cheats the key k. The distortion between k
and t can be defined as a complement form of χ(k, t), namely,
d(k, t) = 1 − χ(k, t). Positive distortion levels ∆ > 0 make
7sense in a situation when the legal user is recognized as such
whenever a “sufficiently high fraction” of the received tags are
authenticated.
It should be pointed out that Sgarro in [17] considered only
the spoofing attack of order 1 by a careful definition of the
fraud matrix. For the spoofing attack of order r, the distortion
between k and tr should be defined as a complement form of
χ(k, tr), namely,
d(k, tr) = 1− χ(k, tr). (36)
The rate-distortion function for the “key source” K with prob-
ability distribution π (often uniform) and distortion measure
d(k, tr) is defined as
R(∆) = min
PK=pi,E{d(K,T r)}<∆
I(K;T r). (37)
For any opponent who observed r messages m1 =
(s1, t1), · · · ,mr = (sr, tr), his/her equivocation about the key
is upper bounded by
H(K|T r) ≤ H(K)−R(∆ = 0), (38)
where the rate-distortion function R(∆) can be numerically
computed.
In what follows, we mainly focus on the channel coding
formulation, as this will eventually be the case (Rc(r) ≤ 1)
for some r’s when the opponent can access r (different)
authentication tags. We point out that even in the case of
r = 1, it is also possible to construct authentication tags
with l ≥ n [18]. The expanded size of tag space can be
well employed to enhance the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) performance for authentication, which, however, is
more vulnerable to potential attackers. This vulnerability can
be remedied by the introduction of artificial noise in ANA-
MACs.
C. A Decoding Approach for Key Recovery in ANA-MACs
For an ANA-MAC under the spoofing attack of order r, we
can characterize it using a quintuple {S,K, T ,Ωr(C), p(y|x)},
where p(y|x) denotes the conditional probability distribution
for the artificially-introduced channel between t¯ (x) and t˜ (y).
In this paper, we always assume a memoryless channel and
hence, p(y|x) =∏rli=1 p(yi|xi).
Firstly, we consider the transmission of MACs, in which
Eve can directly access the r source messages sr and their
tags
y = ~(k, sr) , [~(k, s1), · · · , ~(k, sr)].
Given sr and if the encoding rule
~(·, sr) : K → T r
is an injection (Rc(r) ≤ 1), Eve can recover the key k by
generating a lookup table of size 2n and searching over this
table for finding the key k, which admits y = ~(k, sr).
In the language of coding, it means that the recovery of key
can be considered as decoding of the received signal Y to its
most likely input Kˆ(Y ). Given r messages m1, · · · ,mr, if
any decoder Kˆ(Y ) is of computational complexity O(2n), we
claim that the computational security can be achieved for this
message authentication code.
For ensuring computational security, it requires that no any
efficient decoding algorithm exists for any code C(sr) ∈
Ωr(C). Since the publication of Shannon’s original paper
in 1948, the search of the codes for achieving the channel
capacity has been pursued for several decades. Currently,
linear codes and their efficient decoding algorithms have been
extensively studied. Therefore, for construction of a good
ANA-MAC code, linear code ensembles should be better
avoided as their complexity can often be reduced due to the
linearity of codes. As various hash functions are nonlinear,
this is practically avoided for the construction of MACs based
on the keyed hash functions.
To derive an explicit key for the spoofing attack of order r, it
is best to use a maximum-likelihood decoder for ANA-MACs
if the adversary has unlimited computing power.
Definition 3: Let the binary codeword c ∈ C, which is
further modulated with x(c) and transmitted over the channel
p(y|x), the received vector y ∈ Rrl. A maximum-likelihood
(ML) decoding algorithm decodes the vector y into a codeword
cˆ, such that
cˆ = max
c∈C
p (y|x(c)) . (39)
Definition 4: (ML recoverable) Given y ∈ Rrl and sr,
where y = x+w and x = c¯, c = ~(k, sr). For an ML decoder
kˆ(y), we mean that
kˆ = max
k∈K
p(y|k, sr). (40)
If P (kˆ 6= k) = 0, we claim that the authentication key is ML
recoverable.
We consider a binary-input continuous-output AWGN chan-
nel (Bi-AWGN) as encountered in ANA-MACs (8). Its ca-
pacity C2 (γt) is a function of γt = 1/2σ2w, which can be
explicitly expressed as
C2(γt) =
[
1− 1√
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(y−β)
2/2 log2
(
1 + e−2βy
)
dy
]
,
where β =
√
2γt. As the value of γt is determined by the
introduced artificial noise, one can adjust it in practice for the
best possible performance.
The sphere-packing bound of Shannon [19] provides a lower
bound on the decoding error probability of block codes trans-
mitted over the Bi-AWGN channel. With a coding approach
for MACs, the best possible recovery of key for a potential
eavesdropper to attack ANA-MACs is to use an ML decoder,
with which, the decoding probability can be lower bounded
with the Shannon’s 1959 sphere-packing bound.
Lemma 2: (The SP59 Lower Bound [19]) Consider an
r-order ANA-MAC code {Sr , T r,K,Ωr(C), p(y|x)}. Let a
sequence of source messages sr ∈ Sr be sent, and p(y|x)
represents a Bi-AWGN channel with the signal-to-noise ratio
of γt. For any decoder Kˆ, it is clear that K → ~(K, sr) →
8X → Y → Kˆ form a Markov process. Let Pe = P (K 6= Kˆ),
we have that
Pe > PSPB (l, θ, γt) ,
where
PSPB (l, θ, γt) = Q(
√
2lγt) +
l − 1√
2π
e−lγt
·
∫ pi/2
θ
sin(φ)l−2fl(
√
2lγt cos(φ))dφ,
fl(x) =
1
2
l−1
2 Γ
(
l+1
2
) ∫ ∞
0
zl−1 exp
(
−z
2
2
+ zx
)
dz,
and θ ∈ [0, π] satisfies the inequality 2−lR ≤ Ωl(θ)Ωl(pi) with
Ωl(θ) =
2π
l−1
2
Γ( l−12 )
∫ θ
0
(sin(φ))l−2dφ.
The SP59 bound is exponentially increasing with the block
length l and the exponent is strictly negative for all Rc(r) ,
n
rl > C2(γt), it becomes clear that above capacity the
minimum probability of error goes to 1 exponentially fast with
the block length. Hence, any opponent cannot recover the key
explicitly for a properly-designed ANA-MAC, as summarized
as follows.
Theorem 5: Given an r-order ANA-MAC
{Sr, T r,K,Ωr(C), p(y|x)}. With an artificially-introduced
Bi-AWGN channel of noise variance 1/2γt, we say that this
ANA-MAC can resist any explicit key-recovery attack as
the recovery of key is with error probability exponentially
approaching 1 even for any adversary with an unlimited
power of computation if Rc(r) > C2(γt) when l→∞.
In practice, the key is often of short length, typically of
length 128. Hence, it seems that Theorem 5 makes no sense.
Fortunately, it is well known in coding theory that the decoding
error probability can go to 1 even with short block length
(exponentially) if the signal-to-noise ratio γt is sufficiently
low, which is implied by the SP59 lower bound. We’ll show
numerical results later.
As shown in (29), the conditional cheating probability is
determined by the opponent’s capability to compute the a
posterior probabilities, P (k|t˜r), ∀k ∈ K. Therefore, it is
more fundamental to derive a lower bound on the conditional
equivocation about the key H(K|T˜ r) when the opponent has
accessed r tags.
Theorem 6: (Lower Bound on the Conditional Equivocation
about the Key) For any adversary who has observed r ANA-
MAC pairs of (si, t˜i), i = 1, · · · , r, her/his equivocation about
the key is lower bounded by
H(K|T˜ r) ≥ n
(
1−Rc(r)−1C2(γt)
)
, (41)
where n is the key length and γt is the SNR due to the
introduction of artificial noise in ANA-MACs.
Proof: As the mutual information per channel use be-
tween the observation at the side of Eve and the shared key
1
nI(K; T˜
r) is upper bounded by the channel capacity, his/her
equivocation about K when Eve observed various realizations
of T˜ r can be lower bounded as
H(K|T˜ r) = H(K)− I(K; T˜ r),
≥ H(K)− nRc(r)−1C2(γt)
= n
(
1−Rc(r)−1C2(γt)
)
. (42)
Let
δ = 1−Rc(r)−1C2(γt), (43)
it follows that H(K|T˜ r) ≥ δH(K). Hence, the successful
probability for an eavesdropper to guess the key is about 2−δn.
Clearly, δ is a lower bound on the normalized equivocation
(relative to the entropy of key).
V. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
ANA-MACS
For the design of ANA-MACs, one should carefully balance
the three performance metrics, namely, the successful authen-
tication probability, the false acceptance probability and the
security against spoofing attacks. For simplicity, we focus on
the spoofing attack of order-1 and Rc(1) ≤ 1, in which a
channel coding formulation makes sense.
As shown in (29), the conditional cheating probability is
determined by the opponent’s capability to compute P (k|T˜ =
t˜), ∀k ∈ K. Hence, a tractable metric for the security against
spoofing attacks can be chosen to be the conditional equivo-
cation about the key H(K|T˜ ).
With a channel coding formulation for MACs, we now show
that it is possible to provide a design guideline for balancing
the three performance metrics of ANA-MACs. We start with
a brief review of some basic concepts of channel coding.
A binary (l,M, d) code represents a binary code with length
l, size M = |C|, and minimum Hamming distance d. An
equidistant code (of length l and distance d) is a set C of
vectors of length l (called codewords), such that d(x, y) = d
for all distinct x, y ∈ C.
The distance distribution of a binary code C of length l
is defined to be the (l + 1)-tuple (A0(C), A1(C), ..., Al(C)),
where Ai(C) denotes the mean number of codewords at
Hamming distance i from a fixed codeword.
A code C is said to be distance invariant if the number of
codewords at distance i from a fixed codeword only depends
on i and not on the particular word chosen.
Given s ∈ S and an ANA-MAC, let us first suppose that
the underlying MAC C , C(s) is an equidistant code.
A. Equidistant MACs
Lemma 3 (Semakov and Zinoviev [20]): An optimal bi-
nary equidistant (l,M, d) code exists if and only if there exists
a resolvable balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) with
parameters v = M,k =M/2, λ = l − d, r = l.
For binary equidistant (l,M, d) code, the distance takes the
value of
dopt =
Ml
2(M − 1) =
l + 1
2
(44)
9if dopt is an integer. If dopt is not an integer, i.e. the equidistant
code is not optimal, then the code with d = ⌊dopt⌋ is called a
good equidistant code. Some constructions of good equidistant
codes from balanced arrays and nested BIBDs were described
in [21].
Suppose now that the underlying MACs employed in ANA-
MACs are (l, 2n, d) equidistant codes. Then, it is possible to
compute the three performance metrics.
Firstly, the use of equidistant MACs can facilitate the
computation of the successful authentication probability 1−α
and the false acceptance probability β. According to the
decision metric of (18) and further setting
̺ = ρl,
it follows that
α = 1− PD = Q
(
η¯0 − ̺
σH0
)
= Q
(√
2γtl(1 − ρ)
)
= Q
(√
2γbn(1− ρ)
)
, Q
(√
2γbG
)
(45)
where G , (1− ρ)2, γb , R−1c γt and
β = Pr
(
η = µ¯T t˜ ≥ ρl)
= Q
(√
2γtl (2δd − (1− ρ))
)
= Q
(√
2γbn (2δd − (1− ρ))
)
. (46)
For example, Let us consider the special case of β = α.
According to (45) and (46), this means that
δd,l ,
d
l
=
√
G
n
. (47)
The conditional equivocation about the key H(K|T˜ ) can be
well evaluated by the lower bound proposed in Theorem 6. For
equidistant MACs, we can provide a heuristic approximation
method to evaluate it, which shows an explicit connection
between H(K|T˜ ) and d.
Theorem 7: For an ANA-MAC with the use of (l, 2n, d)
equidistant codes for the underlying MACs, the conditional
equivocation about the key when the opponent has accessed a
single tag can be approximated as
H(K|T˜ ) ≈ n− 4 ln(2)−1Rcγbd. (48)
Proof: Consider that a secret key k shared between Alice
and Bob is used to select a MAC codeword t, which is further
corrupted by artificial noise to form an ANA-MAC codeword
t˜. When Eve receives t˜, she can calculate 2n posteriori
probabilities P (k′|t˜r), k′ ∈ K, or 2n log-likelihood ratios
lk(k
′) = log
P (k|t˜)
P (k′|t˜) =
1
σ2w
n∑
i=1
t˜i[t¯i(k)− t¯i(k′)], k′ ∈ K (49)
Clearly, lk(k) = 0. For equidistant MACs with (Hamming)
distance d, we have that
dH(t(k), t(k
′)) = d, ∀k′ 6= k. (50)
Therefore, it is straightforward to compute the mean and
variance of lk(k′) for ∀k′ 6= k as
E{lk(k′)} = 2
σ2w
d = 4γtd,
Var{lk(k′)} = 4
σ4w
dσ2w =
4
σ2w
d = 8γtd. (51)
In what follows, we denote lk(k′) by lk′ for simplicity. The
posteriori probabilities can now be written as
P (k′|t˜) = e−lk′P (k|t˜), (52)
or
P (k′|t˜) = e
−lk′
1 +
∑
k′ 6=k e
−lk′
. (53)
H(K|T˜ ) = E{H(K|T˜ = t)}
= E
{
−
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|t˜) log2 P (k′|t˜)
}
= E
{
log2
(
1 +
2n−1∑
i=1
e−li
)}
+ln(2)
−1 · E
{ ∑2n−1
i=1 lie
−li
1 +
∑2n−1
i=1 e
−li
}
.
Since 2n is practically very large (2128 for n = 128), the
sum of 2n identically-distributed random variables converges
to the sum of their mean values, namely,
2n−1∑
i=1
e−li ≈
2n−1∑
i=1
E{e−li} = 2n − 1,
2n−1∑
i=1
lie
−li ≈
2n−1∑
i=1
E{lie−li} = −4γtd(2n − 1).
Hence, one finally have that
H(K|T˜ ) ≈ n− ln(2)−1 4γtd(2
n − 1)
2n
≈ n− 4 ln(2)−1Rcγbd.
As expected, the conditional equivocation increases when
the noise variance increases. For ANA-MACs, one has to
consider both the successful authentication probability 1 − α
and the false acceptance probability β, which, however, is
closely related to the noise variance. Therefore, it is of
importance to balance these requirements.
B. General Case
From coding theory, it is well known that the number of
codewords for equidistant codes is very limited, which often
results into a very low coding rate.
For a binary code C of length l having s distances, a general
result by Delsarte [22] implies that
|C| ≤
s∑
i=0
(
l
i
)
. (54)
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It should be pointed out that the derivations of (46) and (48)
require the property of distance invariant for the underlying
codes, since we cannot assume the use of a particular key
between Alice and Bob. Fortunately, Delsarte told us how to
decide if a code is distance invariant.
Lemma 4 (Distance Invariant [22]): Let C be a code for
which the number s of distances is at most equal to the dual
distance d′. Then C is distance invariant.
Unfortunately, it still remains a challenge for design of such
distant-invariant codes in practice.
For ANA-MACs, the complexity-theoretic MACs are em-
ployed, which can be seen as random codes, due to their
pseudorandomness property. Empirically, we claim that the
complexity-theoretic MACs are distance-invariant thanks to
their inherent pseudorandomness, as verified by extensive
numerical results shown in Section-VI.
For the set of random codes of rate Rc, it is well known
that
Ad =
(
l
d
)
2−l(1−Rc), (55)
where Ad denotes the mean number of codewords at Hamming
distance d from a fixed codeword.
Then, according to (46) and (56), it is straightforward to
show that
β =
∑
d>0
Ad
2n
Q
(√
2γbn (2δd − (1− ρ))
)
, (56)
while the successful authentication probability (45) remains
unchanged.
Theorem 8: For an ANA-MAC with the use of (l, 2n)
MACs, the conditional equivocation about the key when the
opponent has accessed a single tag can be approximated as
H(K|T˜ ) ≈ n− 4 ln(2)−1Rcγb · d¯. (57)
where d¯ = (2−n
∑
d dAd).
Proof: Let K(d) denote the set of keys with which the
generated tags are at Hamming distance d from the tag with
k. Clearly,
⋃
d≥0K(d) = K. Hence,
H(K|T˜ ) = E{H(K|T˜ = t)}
= E

log2

1 + ∑
k′∈K/k
e−l
′
k




+ ln(2)−1E
{ ∑
k′∈K/k l
′
ke
−l′k
1 +
∑
k′∈K/k e
−l′
k
}
,
where
E

1 +
∑
k′∈K/k
e−l
′
k

 = 1 +
∑
d≥1
E


∑
k′∈K(d)
e−l
′
k


≈ 2n,
and
E


∑
k′∈K/k
l′ke
−l′k

 =
∑
d≥1
E


∑
k′∈K(d)
l′ke
−l′k


≈
∑
d≥1
Ad(−4γtd).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider ANA-MACs, where the underlying MACs are
constructed by the Rijndael block cipher [18]. Hence, the
underlying MACs in ANA-MACs allow the specification of
variants with the block length (l) and key length (n) both
ranging from 128 to 256 bits in steps of 32 bits.
A. Empirical Distance Distribution of Complexity-Theoretic
MACs
To make sense a channel coding formulation for the
Rijndael-cipher based MACs, we use n = 128 and l = 256.
Hence, the coding rate is Rc = 1/2.
Given a s ∈ S and further fix a k ∈ K, it is straightforward
to generate authentication tags with ∀k′ ∈ K/k, and the Ham-
ming distance between ~(s, k′) and ~(s, k) can be numerically
computed.
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Fig. 1. Distance distribution for random codes and MACs with Rijndael
cipher.
This empirical distance distribution is shown in Fig. 1,
which coincides well with the random codes of the same cod-
ing rate. Extensive numerical results show that this empirical
distance distribution keeps unchanged for the use of ∀s ∈ S
and ∀k ∈ K. Hence, the distant-invariant property has been
empirically confirmed, thanks to the psuedorandomness of the
complexity-theoretic MACs.
B. Fundamental Limits on the Key Recovery Attacks
To attack ANA-MACs, an opponent tries to do her/his best
to decode the key.
A fundamental limit on the opponent’s capability on guess-
ing the key is the conditional equivocation, H(K|T˜ ), which
can be estimated by (57). With a random-code-like distance
distribution, it is immediately to see that d¯ = n. Hence,
H(K|T˜ ) = n(1 − 4(ln 2)−1Rcγb).
Numerically, we, however, found that it is often looser than
the lower bound of (43). This is because that the law of
11
large number holds only approximately when random variables
being summed are dependent.
Fig. 2 shows the lower bound on the normalized conditional
equivocation, as determined by (43). At Eb/N0 = −3 dB,
H(K|T˜ ) > 53. Hence, the successful probability for an
opponent with an unlimited power of computation to guess
the key is about 2−53.
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Fig. 2. Lower bound on the normalized equivocation.
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Fig. 3. The SP59 low bound on the decoding error probability and successful
authentication probability.
If the opponent choose to decode the key based on her/his
observation of a single authentication tag, we can employ
the SP59 lower bound for estimating her/his possibility to
successfully decode the key. Fig. 3 shows the SP59 bound on
the decoding error probability and successful authentication
probability for different Eb/N0’s. As the opponent cannot
do better than an ML decoder, the SP59 bound provides
an over-estimate of its capability on guessing the key. As
shown, the opponent becomes hopeless in guessing the key
whenever Eb/N0 is below about -1 dB, where the decoding
error probability is around 1, while almost perfect successful
authentication probability can still be achieved in this low SNR
regime.
C. Completeness Error vs. False Acceptance Probability
The completeness error α is defined as the complement
of the successful authentication probability, which is closely
connected to the normalized threshold value ρ. By the theory
of hypothesis testing, the completeness error and the false
acceptance probability β is fundamentally balanced with (13).
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Fig. 4. Completeness error and false acceptance probability versus Eb/N0
for different thresholds ρ.
To see the fine tradeoff between α and β, we plot them
in Fig. 4 for different ρ’s. As the conditional equivocation
about the key increases when the SNR decreases, the variance
of the artificial noise is essentially determined by the system
requirement on the completeness error and false acceptant rate.
D. The Effect of Quantization
To facilitate packet transmission, quantization should be
introduced for ANA-MACs. In most cases, 8-bit quantization
is often enough for ANA-MACs and no obvious difference
can be observed in simulations for both the successful authen-
tication probability and false acceptance probability with or
without quantization. For the conditional equivocation about
the key, the introduction of quantization can in general increase
it due to the data processing inequality and the opponent
becomes more difficult for implementing any key-recovery
attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a channel coding approach for the key recovery
problem encountered in the spoofing attacks of MACs. With
this new approach, the computational security for MACs can
be viewed as the requirement of exponential complexity for
all possible decoders to succeed.
A new cryptographic primitive, namely, ANA-MACs, is
proposed by employing the artificial noise to corrupt the
complexity-theoretic MACs. This idea is shown to has some
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degree of information-theoretic security. The proposed ANA-
MACs are similar to the recently-proposed physical layer
authentication schemes, as both are interfered with noise.
However, the proposed ANA-MACs come with the artificially-
introduced noise, the amount of which can be well controlled
to meet various performance metrics. This, however, is not
the case for physical layer authentication schemes, where the
noise is introduced by the channel.
With the introduction of quantization, the proposed ANA-
MACs can be encapsulated in packets and transmitted above
the physical layer just like that of the traditional MACs,
which contrasts sharply with the existing physical layer au-
thentication schemes. We hope that this research can bridge
two closely-related but almost independently developed prim-
itives, namely, information-theoretic authentication codes, and
complexity-theoretic MACs.
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